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INTRODUCTION

"It's not global warming, it's cooking."I As Earth's societies grow and
develop, the atmosphere continues to feel the effects of climate change resulting from increased deforestation, greenhouse gas (GHGs) emissions, and
decreased albedo caused by increasing agriculture and the melting of ice caps
and glaciers.2 In order to combat climate change, many climatologists believe
that an intricate, inter-governmental regulatory approach, aimed at curtailing
emissions at the production stage, is the only solution.3 By reducing the anthropogenic sources of GHGs, climatologists suggest that climate change can
be mitigated or even avoided altogether.4 However, in light of global leaders'
inability to either enhance or extend the Kyoto Protocol, or to adopt a new
GHG regulatory framework, the global model is quickly doing nothing to
combat the climate change crisis.5 Many researchers and policymakers now
believe that a plan B needs to be developed to better address the climate
change crisis given that current regulatory framework does not keep GHGs
below the threshold limit.6
This leaves the 500 pound gorilla in the room begging the question:
What can be done while policy makers are bickering with each other and not
getting anywhere? Many researchers believe the answer lies in utilizing technology to mitigate climate change by manipulating the environment to reduce global temperature, a process known as geoengineering.7 Within that
context, there exist varying regulatory frameworks, on both a national and
international level, that currently aim at the development and implementation
of geoengineering.
Geoengineering includes a myriad of different strategies, e.g., undertaking ocean iron fertilization (OIF) to encourage growth of carbon capturing
phytoplankton, releasing sulfur dioxide into the stratosphere to increase
global albedo, engaging in reforestation to capture carbon dioxide in plant
matter, and placing mirrors in outer space to reflect a portion of the sunlight
that would enter Earth's atmosphere to name a few.8 Each strategy is affected

1.

Robin Williams: Weapons of Self Destruction (HBO 2009).

2.

Eric W. Orts, Climate Contracts, 29

3.

Id.

4.

Id. at 203.

5.

Cinnamon P. Carlame, Arctic Dreams and Geoengineering Wishes: The Collateral Damage of Climate Change, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 602, 603
(2011).

6.

Tracy D. Hester, Remaking the World to Save It: Applying U.S. Environmental
Laws to Climate Engineering Projects, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 851, 858 (2011).
See infra Section II.A.

7.
8.

VA. ENVTL.

L.J. 197, 199 (2011).

Ralph Bodle, Climate Law and Geoengineering, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE
LAw 447, 447 (Erkki J. Hollo et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter Bodle, Climate Law
and Geoengineering].
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by applicable state, as well as international law, because the implementation
of each strategy results in consequences that transcend state boundaries.
This article will analyze the legal status of OIF in order to shed light on
whether this strategy could be legally viable. To date, there have been over
ten OIF experiments conducted worldwide, including a controversial OIF experiment conducted by Planktos, Inc. (Planktos).9 In order to fully analyze
the legal implications of OIF, it is important to understand the purpose and
process of OIF. To that end, Part II will introduce the broad concept of
geoengineering and the surrounding debate. Part m will explore OIF, focusing on the Planktos scenario. Part IV will examine United States laws appli0
cable to OIF, and Part V will analyze applicable international laws.' Part VI
will hypothesize other alternative solutions regarding the development and
implementation of OIF.

II.

INTRODUCTION TO GEOENGINEERING

"Humans have been disrupting the Earth's climate for hundreds of
thousands of years."I Historically, the atmosphere has been altered through
development and progress. However, this development and progress is
drowning us. As the problem magnified, the solution was to look towards
technology; thus, geoengineering was born.
A.

Definition of Geoengineering

In order to understand geoengineering, it helps to have a working definition of the term. Geoengineering is generally defined as the "deliberate intervention in the planetary environment of a nature and scale intended to
counteract anthropogenic climate change and/or its impacts through, inter
alia, solar radiation management or removing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere."12 In other words, "geoengineering is the study of how to mess
with the planet even more than we already have, with the hope of moving the
global climate back in the other direction."13 Most definitions include three

9.

10.

11.

12.

Planktos, Inc. is a U.S. corporation that looked to capitalize on the economic
incentives created by OIF by using OIF to sell carbon credits to companies that
were subjected to the Kyoto Protocol. Planktos and the economic incentives
involved will be addressed more fully infra Section HI.B.
Section V is meant only to look at the applicable law, not to discuss the enforcement of international law. Discussing the enforcement of international
laws is beyond the scope of this article.
Max G. Bronstein, Readily Deployable Approaches to Geoengineering: Cool
Materials and Aggressive Reforestation, 10 SUSTAINABLE DEv. L. & POL'Y 44,
44 (2010).
Bodle, Climate Law and Geoengineering, supra note 8, at 447-48.

13. Melissa Eick, A NavigationalSystem for Uncharted Waters: The London Convention and London Protocol'sAssessment Framework on Ocean Iron Fertilization, 46 TULSA L. REv. 351, 353 (2010) (internal citations omitted).
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main elements: that manipulation (1) is intentional, (2) is of the climate, and
(3) is made in an effort to mitigate the effects of anthropogenic sources of
GHGs.14 An unofficial, and optional, fourth element is that the manipulation
is conducted through the use of technology.15
Geoengineering is typically grouped into two broad umbrella categories:
carbon sequestration (CS) and solar radiation management (SRM).16 CS is a
two-step process that (1) removes carbon dioxide (C0 2 ) from the atmosphere; and (2) stores the captured CO 2 in order to remove it from the atmosphere for a climatically relevant period7 in an attempt to cool the Earth.18 In
contrast, SRM attempts to cool the Earth, not by addressing GHG emissions,
but by reducing the amount of energy in the atmosphere.19 This is typically
accomplished by reflecting the sun's rays back into space through a variety
of techniques-from mirrors in space to injecting sulfate aerosols into the
atmosphere.20
B.

The Pros and Cons of Geoengineering

Geoengineering is a nascent and controversial concept that constitutes a
"fringe topic" in the global warming debate.21 Many scientists, policymakers,
and private entities tout the benefits of geoengineering and they push for the
continuation of responsible research to prove its viability. These parties promote geoengineering as the most economically feasible option to the war on
climate change available to policymakers given the complexity of implementing another alternative emission reduction scheme.22 Economic feasibility allows developing countries to participate in the implementation of a
global geoengineering project, thus promoting global participation and acceptance of any adopted plan.23 Additionally, geoengineering could be used
as a kind of insurance policy, buying time for policymakers to develop and
14.

Hester, supra note 6, at 865-66.

15.

Not every technique uses technology, e.g. reforestation.

16.

Bodle, Climate Law and Geoengineering, supra note 8, at 450.

17.

Id. at 452.

18.

Eick, supra note 13, at 354.

19.

Bodle, Climate Law and Geoengineering, supra note 8, at 452.

20.

Id. at 451. This article will not cover SRM techniques because those techniques
are only theoretical and will not be ready for development for at least another
few years.

21.

Eick, supra note 13, at 355.

22.

Rafael Leal-Arcas & Andrew Filis-Yelaghotis, Geoengineering A Future for
Humankind: Some Technical and Ethical Considerations, 2 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 128, 132 (2012).

23.

Id. at 129.
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implement a comprehensive emission regulation scheme.24 Finally,
geoengineering can be implemented unilaterally, which could, in the presence of political grandstanding and inactivity, allow states the opportunity to
mitigate the effects of climate change even in the absence of an international
regulatory scheme.25 Unilateral implementation could be quickly initiated in
the face of a climate emergency, and could produce relatively rapid results.26
In contrast, GHG emission regulation would require politically cumbersome,
multilateral agreements and require a long lead time until a significant effect
would be realized.27
Geoengineering doubters, however, point to the paucity of scientific
literature on the subject to emphasize geoengineering's major weaknesses:
extreme risk and pervasive uncertainty.28 They express concern that using
technology to manipulate the Earth's natural processes is akin to playing
God.29 This large-scale manipulation also raises concerns about severe adverse environmental side effects,30 such as "unexpected effects on precipitation patterns, atmospheric quality, and ecosystems."31
These doubters also point to political concerns. 32 They fear that policymakers may turn a blind eye to their "moral" duty to solve the climate crisis
if geoengineering proves successful.33 For example, there is concern that, if
geoengineering is successful, the legislative and executive branches would
cease to address global warming, both locally and internationally. These parties reason that the diminution of global warming symptoms would hide the
issue from public view, effectively sweeping it under the rug. Critics also
point out that the success of geoengineering may promote the restructuring of
climate change mitigation policy because geoengineering would falsely appear to be solving the problem.34 In this regard, there is a fear that United
States policymakers will adopt policies that remove GHG regulation as the
goal, and instead implement policies that focus solely on geoengineering as
band aid solution. Critics further argue that a decrease in GHG regulation
policies would eventually leave Earth's atmosphere as GHG-ridden as Ve-

24.

Eick, supra note 13, at 354.

25.

Hester, supra note 6, at 871.

26.

Eick, supra note 13, at 355.

27.

Id.

28.

Id.

29.

Leal-Arcas & Filis-Yelaghotis, supra note 22, at 132.

30.

Eick, supra note 13, at 354,

31.

Albert C. Lin, Revamping Our Approach to Emerging Technologies, 76
BROOK. L. REv. 1309, 1321 (2011).

32.

Leal-Arcas & Filis-Yelaghotis, supra note 22, at 132-33.

33.

Id. at 132.

34.

Id.
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nus's. Finally, critics emphasize that there may be a shift of power to those
who support geoengineering, which could also change the socio-political nature of the international political scene.35 For instance, if China were able to
successfully implement geoengineering techniques that allowed countries to
continue to increase their GHG emissions-while hiding the effect of climate
change-China could gain enough international political support to supplant
the United States as the world's premier power. China's allies, such as North
Korea, could also gain political power in such a scenario, essentially establishing them as the drivers of international policy determinations.

III.
A.

OCEAN IRON FERTILIZATION

Overview

Ocean Iron Fertilization (OIF) is a form of geoengineering that involves
carbon sequestration.36 Currently, OIF is the most researched, plausible, and
economically feasible CS technique available.37 More importantly, it is the
most regulated geoengineering technique currently available.38 OIF is a technique used to stimulate phytoplankton blooms by introducing specific trace
nutrients, usually iron sulfate, into the water column.39 This technique was
inspired by the observation that iron-rich dusts blown into the ocean trigger
phytoplankton blooms.40 The purpose of creating a phytoplankton bloom is
simple: growing phytoplankton removes CO 2 from the atmosphere,41 and
when the phytoplankton dies that CO 2 is stored in the depths of the ocean. 42
CO 2 is stored in the ocean in one of three ways: (1) on the ocean floor in
dead phytoplankton, which consume and store CO 2 during photosynthesis;
(2) in fecal material of organisms that graze on carbon sequestering
phytoplaknton; or (3) in the food web, as carbon sequestering phytoplankton
and their grazers are eaten by larger organisms.43

35.

Id. at 128.

36.

Till Markus & Harald Ginzky, Regulating Climate Engineering:Paradigmatic
Aspects of the Regulation of Ocean Fertilization, 4 CARBON & CLIMATE L.
REv. 477, 477 (2011).

37.

Id. at 477-78.

38.

Id. at 478; Bodle, Climate Law and Geoengineering, supra note 8, at 453.

39.

K. Russell LaMotte, Legal Posture of Ocean Iron Fertilization Under International Law, 13 ABA AGRIC. MGMT. COMM. NEWSL. 2 (ABA, Chicago, IL),
Feb. 2009, at 9.

40.

Id.

41.

Markus & Ginzky, supra note 36, at 478.

42.

Hugh Powell, Fertilizing the Ocean with Iron: Should We Add Iron to the Sea
to Help Reduce Greenhouse Gases in the Air?, 46 OCEANUS MAG. 1, Jan. 2008,
at 5.

43.

Eick, supra note 13, at 357.
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OIF is the current target of a moratorium, recommended by the 9th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity44 due to the
technique's contradictory results and potential risks.45 In spite of this, OIF
may be gaining favor.46 The London Convention/London Protocol Consultative Meeting's Resolution, adopted on October 31, 2008, promoted OIF research.47 Supporters of OIF highlight that the scientific community has
benefitted from OIF research because it has provided an increased understanding of marine processes. 48 Additionally, supporters argue that continued OIF experimentation is necessary because of OIF's potential to improve
phytoplankton and fish stocks, which are both dwindling because the increase in CO 2 has caused ocean acidification. 49 Finally, supporters point to
the fact that OIF, unlike other geoengineering proposals, is based on natural
processes.50
However, OIF is not unanimously heralded. OIF's critics fear that
manipulating the foundation of the food chain may have far-reaching consequences.5 1 These potential consequences include: (1) nullification of any OIF
benefit, as phytoplankton may produce GHGs worse than CO 2, such as methane; (2) ocean acidification caused by increased CO 2 levels from the physiologic respiration of larger numbers of phytoplankton and their grazers; (3)
increased uptake of other necessary nutrients by phytoplankton, affecting the
ecosystem up the food chain; (4) potential toxic phytoplankton blooms, composed of phytoplankton that are toxic to marine mammals; and (5) "higher
surface water temperature, which would both increase global warming and
diminish OfF experiments' effectiveness" caused by increased amounts of
phytoplankton absorbing sunlight.52
Further, there is debate as to how effective OIF could be in actually
sequestering CO 2,53 because the relocation of CO 2 to the ocean floor, instead
of releasing it in the top 500 meters, only removes it for a couple of de-

44.

See discussion infra Part V.B.2.

45.

LaMotte, supra note 39, at 8, 10-11.

46.

Eick, supra note 13, at 355-56.

47.

See discussion of how and to what extent the LC/LP promoted OIF research
infra Part V.B.4.

48.

Markus & Ginzky, supra note 36, at 478.

49.

Eick, supra note 13, at 357.

50.

Frequently Asked Questions About Ocean Fertilization, CLImos, http://www
.climos.com/faq.php (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).

51.

Eick, supra note 13, at 357-58.

52.

Id. at 358.

53.

Id. at 357.
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cades.54 Results from about half of the OIF expeditions show that only a
marginal amount of C0 2 , fifteen percent or less, is sequestered and settled in
the ocean depths.55 The remaining CO 2 is released back into the water column within the top 500 meters by grazing zooplankton respiration. It then reenters the atmosphere within only a couple of decades.56 In other words, anywhere from eighty-five to ninety-nine percent of the carbon sequestered is
released back into the atmosphere, which in turn contributes to the climate
change problem within a relatively short time period. Fifteen percent of sequestered oceanic CO 2 represents between ten and twenty-five percent of the
annual global CO 2 emissions.57 For OIF to effectively mitigate climate
change, it is imperative that the CO 2 reach the oceans' depths. Only then will
it remain sequestered for hundreds, if not thousands, of years, due to both
slow metabolic and decomposition processes at that depth,58 and the length of
time it takes for compounds in deep water to reach the "mixed-layer" 59 via
the global conveyor belt and upwelling. 60
B.

The Planktos Project

In 2008, the U.S.-based company Planktos, Inc.61 aimed to capitalize on
OIF by selling the potential C02 sequestration as carbon credits to companies that were subject to the Kyoto Protocol.62 Planktos proposed to under54.

Randall S. Abate & Andrew B. Greenlee, Sowing Seeds Uncertain: Ocean Iron
Fertilization, Climate Change, and the International Environmental Law
Framework, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 555, 56-70 (2010).

55.

Id.

56.

Id.

57.

Id. at 562.

58.

Brad A. Seibel & Jeffrey C. Drazen, The Rate of Metabolism in Marine Animals: Environmental Constraints, Ecological Demands, and Energetic Opportunities, 362 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS, 2061, 2065 (Nov. 29, 2007), http://rstb.roy

59.

60.

61.
62.

alsocietypublishing.org/content/royptb/362/1487/2061.full.pdf.
The ocean's mixed layer maintains a relatively uniform density due primarily
to wind and wave action, which act as agitators. See generally Mixed-layer:
definition, EARTH AND SPACE RESEARCH, http://www.esr.org/outreach/glossary/
mixed_1ayer.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2015).
Jennifer Horton, How Ocean Currents Work, How STuFF WORKS, http://science.howstuffworks.com/environmental/earth/oceanography/ocean-current3
.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2015).
Planktos, Inc. was the first U.S.-based company to plan an OIF project for
commercial purposes.
Abate & Greenlee, supra note 54, at 558. OIF could also be regulated through
treaties, like the Kyoto Protocol, or the parties to a treaty could expressly determine that OIF may be used as a carbon sink for carbon credit purposes. See
discussion infra Part VI.
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take this endeavor in the Galapagos Islands, of all places.63 During the
preparation stage of the Galapagos project, Planktos received a letter from
the EPA alleging possible violations of the Ocean Dumping Ban Act of
1988.64 In response to the EPA's concerns, Planktos's ceased the use of U.S.
flagged vessels.65 The project ultimately failed due to lack of funding,66 but it
raised an important question: What legal constraints might arise against a
similar project undertaken by a United States corporation in the future, with
or without federal funding?
Before discussing the legal status of OIF, it is important to understand
why a corporation like Planktos is interested in conducting OIF activities.
Surely it is not for the purely altruistic reason of saving the world for future
generations. Corporations typically choose to undertake this kind of project
when an economic incentive exists. Here, Planktos sought to capitalize on the
high profits that might result through the sale of carbon credits, created
through OIF, to companies that are subject to the Kyoto Protocol. For a back
of the envelop calculation of the profitability of OIF use the following information; iron powder can be purchased for between $500-$6000 per ton depending on the powder size and purity,67 and carbon credits were valued at
over $30 per credit in 2008.68 Further, laboratory results suggest that one ton
of iron added to the ocean could cause a phytoplankton bloom that would
sequester 1000 tons of carbon from the atmosphere.69 Using $6000 per ton of
carbon, one voyage distributing one hundred tons of iron, 1000 tons of carbon sequestered per ton of iron used, the standard of one ton of carbon equals
one carbon credit, and $30 per carbon credit; the profit that could be realized
by one voyage to add iron into the ocean could be $2,400,000 on the conservative end. Of course, this figure does not account for the cost of the
vessel, crew, and other fixed costs associated with dispersing iron powder
into the ocean, but it is obvious that OIF has the potential to yield large
profits.

63.

LaMotte, supra note 39, at 9-10.

64.

Abate & Greenlee, supra note 54, at 558.

65.

Id.; see discussion infra Part IV.A. (explaining the importance of not using a
U.S. flagged vessel).

66.

Id.

67.

Iron-Powders.com, http://www.iron-powder.com/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).

68.

Stanley Reed & Mark Scott, In Europe, Paid Permits for Pollution are Fizzling, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/22/business/energy-environmentleuropes-carbon-market-is-sputtering-as-prices-dive
.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0 (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).

69.

Oceanus, Fertilizing the Ocean with Iron; Should We Add Iron to the Sea to
Help Reduce Greenhouse Gases in the Air? (Nov. 13, 2007), https://www.whoi
.edu/oceanus/viewArticle.do?id=34167.
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OIF

United States Jurisdiction Over Vessels

On March 10, 1983, President Ronald Reagan executed Presidential
Proclamation 5030, allowing the United States to assert "sovereign rights
over natural resources and related jurisdiction" located in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).70 The EEZ extends two hundred nautical miles71 from the
baseline, and is used to establish the territorial seas. 72 The EEZ, created by
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, permits the use and
exploitation of both living and non-living resources contained in waters located within the zone. 73 A nation that expressly exercises its rights over the
EEZ is granted sovereignty over the regulation of
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, 74 whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the sea-

70.

Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 14, 1983).

71.

A nautical mile is equal to 1.151 land miles. Nautical Mile vs. Mile, DIFFEN,
http://www.diffen.com/difference/MilevsNauticalMile (last visited Oct. 19,
2015).

72.

Proclamation No. 5030, supra note 71. Territorial seas run from a baseline
determined by international law to a distance of twelve nautical miles, established pursuant Presidential Proclamation 5928. See Proclamation No. 5928, 54
Fed. Reg. 777 (Jan. 9, 1989). Until the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, the territorial seas were only three nautical miles from the baseline.
Three miles was the distance that a canon could fire, and therefore was the
distance that a country could realistically defend. However, this distance has
increased because of advances in warfare technology. See generally The United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A HistoricalPerspective), UNITED
NATIONS DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA

(2012),

http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention-agreements/convention historical-per
spective.htm. Some statutes, such as the Clean Water Act, that were created
prior to Presidential Proclamation 5928 have language that continues to limit
the territorial seas to only three nautical miles from the baseline. See 33 U.S.C
§ 1362(8) (2014). The Contiguous Zone once stretched from the baseline to
twelve nautical miles, but in 1999 was expanded to stretch twenty-four nautical
miles past the baseline. This zone was established so that states could enforce
their customs. See Proclamation No. 7219, 64 Fed. Reg. 48701 (Sept. 8, 1999).
73.

Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, Dec.
10, 1982, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas, art. 56, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF 62/122 (Dec. 10, 1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS]. See discussion infra
Part V.B.5.

74.

Even though the United States has not ratified the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, the United States argues that the provisions that make
up the convention are customary international law or have become customary
law that it can enforce against parties to the convention. This is evidenced by

the Presidential Proclamations that expanded the territorial seas and contiguous
zone and that established the EEZ. Proclamation No. 5030, supra note 71;
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bed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other- activities for
the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production
of energy from the water, currents and winds.75
Further, the coastal state has jurisdiction over marine scientific research
including the protection and preservation of marine environments. 76 Therefore, when the United States, pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 5030,
expressed its rights to the EEZ, it acquired the ability to create and enforce
regulations that affect the exploitation or conservation of the natural resources and environments found within the EEZ.77 The United State's reach
under the EEZ includes all vessels, regardless of their state of origin, which
are physically present.78 Therefore, if the vessel "belong[s] in whole or in
part to the United States or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created
by or under the laws of the United States, or of any State, Territory, District,
or possession thereof," the vessel and the people on board are in U.S. jurisdiction and subject to U.S. law. 79 Therefore, if a U.S. vessel travels outside of
the EEZ and violates a U.S. law-such as dumping waste into the oceanthe vessel would still fall under the jurisdiction of the U.S. and thus would
still be subject to any applicable statute. Also, if a U.S. vessel is required to
have a permit to conduct an activity in either territorial seas or the EEZ, the
U.S. vessel would require the same permit on the high seas. Thus, one can
see that by informing the EPA that it would no longer use a United States
flagged vessel, Planktos attempted to remove itself from EPA jurisdiction.
Indeed, after a non-national vessel leaves the EEZ of the U.S., it is no longer
under U.S. jurisdiction,80 even if there is a violation of U.S. law, regardless
of the presence of an applicable statute. 81 Therefore, any U.S. corporation
undertaking the implementation of Planktos' project can circumvent U.S.
regulation if the project is conducted on a non-U.S. flagged vessel, as long as
no international laws prohibit an OIF expedition.82

Proclamation No. 5928, supra note 74; Proclamation No. 7219, supra note 74.
The adoption of the Magnuson-Stevens Act is further evidence because it recognizes the United States' authority over highly migratory fish populations, a
provision that was established in the Convention. See 16 U.S.C § 1851(a)
(2007).
75.

UNCLOS, supra note 74, art. 56(1)(a).

76.

Id. art. 56(1)(b).

77.

See id. art 55, 58; Proclamation No. 5030, supra note 71.

78.

Id.

79.

18 U.S.C. § 7 (2001).

80.

Abate & Greenlee, supra note 54, at 558.

81.

See 18 U.S.C. § 7(1).

82.

See discussion of international obligations infra Part V.
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Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act

Unlike other U.S. statutes, the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA), also known as the Ocean Dumping Act, has already
been called upon to challenge an OIF project.83 As noted above, MPRSA
could have required Planktos to obtain a permit for their OIF project if the
project either took place in U.S. waters was conducted using a U.S. flagged
vessel.84 MPRSA is relevant to OIF regulation because it implements the
United States' obligations under the London Convention, which restricts
dumping of material into the high seas.85
MPRSA "regulate[s] the dumping of all types of materials into ocean
waters and [ ] prevent[s] or strictly limit[s] the dumping into ocean waters of
any material which would adversely affect human health, welfare, or amenities, or the marine environment, ecological systems, or economic potentialities,"86 by requiring a permit whenever an individual: (1) transports material
from the United States for the purpose of ocean dumping; (2) transports material from anywhere for the purpose of ocean dumping by U.S. agencies or
U.S. flagged vessels; or (3) dumps material transported from outside the
United States into the U.S. territorial sea or into the contiguous zone to the
extent that it may affect the territorial sea or the territory of the United
States. 87 This prevents the dumping of any material by a U.S. agency or U.S.
flagged vessel in any part of the ocean without a permit. MPRSA also prevents foreign vessels from dumping within the territorial seas or the U.S.
contiguous zone. Given the express extraterritorial reach of the statute,
MPRSA may provide a strong platform to regulate OIF or any other oceanic
geoengineering strategy that lies outside of other U.S. statutes.88 Dumping is
defined under the MPRSA as "a disposition of material." 89 Material is defined as
matter of any kind or description, including, but not limited to,
dredged material, solid waste, incinerator residue, garbage, sewage, sewage sludge, munitions, radiological, chemical, and biological warfare agents, radioactive materials, chemicals, biological
83.

Hester, supra note 6, at 886.

84.

Id.

85.

Id.
33 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2014).

86.
87.
88.
89.

33 U.S.C. § 1401(c).
Hester, supra note 6, at 887.
The following three activities do not constitute "dumping": (1) the creation of
an effluent subject to the Clean Water Act, (2) construction of a fixed structure,
and (3) deposit of materials to promote fishery resources. If the Clean Water
Act is applicable, then MPRSA is not applicable; and if MPRSA is applicable,
then the Clean Water Act cannot be applicable jurisdictionally. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1402(f) (2014).
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and laboratory waste, wreck or discarded equipment, rock, sand,
excavation debris, and industrial, municipal, agricultural, and
other waste. 90
Because iron is "matter," putting the iron into the oceans is a "disposition"
that the MPRSA regulates.91 But two questions remain: First, is iron fertilization dumping, or applying with a purpose? Second, are "dumping" and "applying with a purpose" two distinct concepts identified as such by MPRSA?
These questions have not been answered, and they demonstrate the EPA's
potential motivation in requiring Planktos to obtain a permit for their OF.
But in order to require a permit, the EPA would have to determine whether
the OIF "will not unreasonably degrade or endanger human health, welfare,
or amenities, or the marine environment, ecological systems, or economic
potentialities."92 In order to make this determination, specific criteria need to
be considered. 93 However, the status of OIF under MPRSA is still uncertain
because the EPA has not yet fully considered these issues. In the future, it
will only take one OIF project to force the EPA to consider the applicability
of MPRSA to OIF.
If EPA looked into the issue more closely, MPRSA would cover OIF.
OIF is brought under the statute through two jurisdictional hooks. First, OIF
requires a "dumping" of material, namely iron.94 Second, iron is a type of
"matter or any kind" and does not fall within the exceptions for sewage from
a vessel and oil.95 Therefore, no OIF activities can be undertaken without a
MPRSA permit. In order to obtain a permit, an EPA Administrator considers
the effect that the project will have on human health and welfare, marine
ecosystems, and alternative uses of the ocean. 96 However, conclusive data on
these effects is not yet available. Therefore, without further research into the
effects of OIF, it is possible that the Administrator will not issue permits for
OIF activities, relying on an inability to determine how the project will affect
human health and welfare and marine ecosystems. However, if more conclusive positive results become available, the Administrator will likely grant the
required permit. Thus, until more information becomes available, OIF as a
commercial enterprise will remain grounded.

90.

Id. § 1402(c).

91.

See id. § 1402(c), (f).

92.

33 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (2007).

93.

Id.

94. See 33 U.S.C. § 1402(f).
95. See id. § 1402(c).
96.

See 33 U.S.C. § 1412.
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Clean Water Act

Under the Clean Water Act (CWA), the discharge of a pollutant from a
point source is unlawful, unless subject to a federally mandated permit.97 The
CWA applies to any activity undertaken by a "person"98 where there is a
discharge of any pollutant from a point source into a navigable water. 99
While the amount of discharge deemed unlawful is not statutorily defined,
EPA has adopted a net addition analysis in which a net increase of a pollutant, even if that pollutant is already present in the body of water, a discharge
is found.100 Thus, a pollutant is almost anything that can be added into the
water.101

A "point source" is any "discernible, confined and discrete conveyance," a definition that includes vessels.102 However, an exception exists for
vessels if they add pollutants to the ocean outside of navigable waters. 03
"Navigable waters" means the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas but not the contiguous zone, EEZ, or high seas. 04 Therefore, the
CWA may apply to vessels that are engaged in an OIF project only if the
vessel is within the territorial seas.
Establishing the jurisdictional question is further complicated by CWA
403 regulations, which "establish guidelines for issuance of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits for the discharge of
pollutants from a point source into the territorial seas, the contiguous zone,
and the oceans."105 These guidelines allow for a point source to discharge if
the Administrator determines that the discharge will not cause an "unreasonable degradation of the marine environment."106 Essentially, after determining how much of the pollutant may be discharged, the permit is assigned a
limit. However, the permit does not allow a pollutant discharge if the Administrator is unable to determine the extent and reasonableness of the degrada97.
98.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

33 U.S.C. § 1311.
A "person" is any "individual, corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, or political subdivision of a State, or any interstate
body." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (2014).
Id.
JEFFREY M. GABA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 90 (4th ed. 2009).
33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).
Id. § 1362(14).
Id. § 1362(12)(A).
Id. § 1362(7). The CWA defines the territorial seas as three nautical miles from
the base line. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(8). This limit was not automatically increased
after Presidential Proclamation 5928. See Proclamation No. 5928, supra note
74.

105. 40 C.F.R. § 125.120 (2000).
106. 40 C.F.R. § 125.122 (2013).
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tion. Thus, an OIF could be regulated under the CWA in two ways: (1) an
administrative determination that possible negative effects of OIF are likely
to occur; or (2) an administrative determination that there is insufficient scientific data to show that the negative effects would be minimal. In the first
scenario, the administrator would regulate, or ban, OIF ventures by prohibiting any discharge of iron based on the "degradation of waters" determination.107 In the second scenario, no discharge may occur unless various criteria
are met.108 Further, the discharging vessel is required to meet the "Best
Available Technology" standard followed by all other discharge.109 Moreover, if the CWA requires vessels to carry discharge permits in United States
waters, a U.S. vessel would require a permit in the EEZ as well as in the open
ocean. However, if the entire discharge activity took place beyond the territorial seas, no NPDES permit is required. Therefore, because OIF activities
take place outside of the territorial seas, no NPDES permit is required. Regardless, we will continue and analyze all elements.
The next issue is also jurisdictional, specifically whether intentionally
placing an identified substance into navigable waters for a beneficial purpose
is different than discharging effluent. This issue is not settled. For instance,
in Weinburg v. Romero Barcelo, the Supreme Court ruled that intentionally
dropping bombs into the ocean triggered the permit requirement of the
CWA.1lo Indeed, the CWA does list "munitions" as pollutants that need to be
regulated."' The Court determined that it was this designation-and not intent-that triggered the permit requirement. Therefore, if iron is classified as
a pollutant, this element is satisfied. Similarly, in National Cotton Council of
America v. EPA, the Court addressed whether the addition of a pesticide to a
navigable water requires a permit.12 The Court held that if a substance that
could be considered waste is used for its intended purpose, then it itself is not
waste,1 3 but any portion remaining is considered a pollutant requiring a permit."14 Thus, if iron is classified as a pollutant or if the list of pollutants
contained in the CWA is not exhaustive or narrowly interpreted,"5 then it is
possible that a permit would be required for any iron discharge above the
level the Administrator deems necessary to fulfill the purpose of the iron
discharge. In that case a company like Planktos would be able to undertake
O1F activities, as long as it does not discharge in excess of the Administra-

107. 40 C.F.R. § 125.123 (2000).
108. Id.
109. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(F).
110. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 329 (1982).
111. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).
112. Nat'l Cotton Council of Am. v. EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 929-30 (6th Cir. 2009).
113. Id. at 936.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 935-36.
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tor's determination and does not trigger other permit requirements.116 It is
important to remember that if Planktos undertakes the OIF activities beyond
the statutory three mile territorial seas, then no permit would be required at
all. Therefore, an OIF project may still fall outside of the purview of the
CWA, even when all other elements are established, if the OIF activities are
conducted well beyond the territorial seas. Importantly, however, because
OIF is regulated under MPRSA, the CWA would not control because both
statutes cannot regulate the same activity.
D.

Endangered Species Act

The Endangered Species Act (ESA) was adopted to facilitate the conservation of threatened and endangered speciesll7 and their habitats.'18 The ESA
applies to any person subject to the jurisdiction of the Unites States upon the
high seas."1 9 Therefore, this statute applies to any corporation using a U.S.
flagged vessel, and thus, OIF could be regulated by the ESA. But what would
the ESA regulate?
The ESA prohibits the taking of a protected species.120 Specifically, a
person subject to the authority of U.S. law may not "harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect [a listed species], or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."21 "Harm," within the definition of
"take," encompasses any "act which actually kills or injures wildlife." 122
These types of acts include "significant habitat modification or degradation
where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering."123 In other
words, if an OIF project could be shown to actually injure a listed species by
modifying its environment, OIF may be prohibited. For instance, assume that
an increase in phytoplankton does acidify the oceans, and that this can be

116. See id.

117. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2015) (listing threatened and endangered species). This
list includes not only animals found within the borders of the United States, but
every threatened or endangered animal on the planet. The list includes sea turtles, many species of whale, corals, crustaceans, and many other marine species. These species may potentially inhabit every nook and cranny of the
planet, including the open and coastal oceans.
118. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2014).
119. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(C) (2015).
120. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B).
121. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2015).
122. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2006).
123. Id.
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linked to OIF. This acidification, which damages krill embryos,124 will drastically reduce the numbers of krill that grow during the year. Because krilt are
the staple food of all baleen whales, which includes right, blue, and gray
whales and which are listed as endangered, the reduction of krill could starve
these large animals. Thus O1F would constitute a taking under the ESA because it would affect the feeding behaviors or cause the death of whales.125
Further, the ESA requires every agency to "insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . .. is not likely to jeopardize
the continued existence" of a critical habitatl26 of any listed species.127 It is
important to remember that the "not likely to jeopardize" requirement mandates that every federal agency review every action it undertakes for compliance with the ESA. Therefore, if the issuance of an OIF permit or license
pursuant to another statute is funded at least in part by an agency program,
one must consider the impact to listed species that may result.128 If the action
will adversely affect the listed species, reasonable and prudent alternatives
may be offered or the action may be postponed indefinitely.129
However, there are two exceptions that a company may utilize in an
attempt to avoid the ESA's taking prohibition. First is an exception for scientific purposes.1 30 Research that would help develop the knowledge base of
OIF, analyze its benefits and/or detriments, or help to shape the scientific and
legal understanding of this strategy qualifies under this exception. The second exception applies to activities that are "incidental to, and not the purpose
of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity."I31 Assuming that OIF is
a lawful activity, the entity requesting the exception submits: a conservation
plan identifying the impact of the taking, the minimization and mitigation
steps to be taken, the viability of potential alternative actions considered, and
any other measures required by the Secretary of the Interior.132 However,
there is a hindrance to this process. After an exception request is submitted,
the public must be given the opportunity to comment and be heard. 133 This
may obstruct the granting of an exception, and essentially a permit, if the
public is against OIF.

124. Krill Face Deadly Cost of Ocean Acidification, OCEAN ACIDIFICATION BLOG
(Oct. 10, 2010), http://oceanacidification.wordpress.com/2010/10/14/krill-facedeadly-cost-of-ocean-acidification/.
125. See 50 C.F.R § 17.3 (2006).
126. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.95 (2008) (listing the critical habitat for all listed species).
127. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2015).
128. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (1986).
129. 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
130. 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2015).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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To summarize, OIF would be subject to the ESA. However, the public's
views aside, it appears that OIF would be able to satisfy the requirements of
the ESA, at least through the statutory exceptions. For example, it could be
argued that a non-commercial OIF project would be conducted for scientific
purposes, making any taking merely incidental to the activity. This interpretation removes ESA application and permits the undertaking of OIF projects.
Therefore, as long as a MPRSA permit is required, the permitting agency is
required to evaluate the project and determine its potential to jeopardize any
listed marine species. In other words, the taking requirement would apply at
all times. Thus, it would be prudent for a company to fully research the effects of the project prior to applying for an incidental-taking permit.
E.

Marine Mammal Protection Act

The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) imposes a moratoriuml 34
on the "taking" of any marine mammal by a "person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or any vessel or other conveyance subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States"l35 on the high seas. 136 Under the MMPOA,
a taking occurs when a person harasses, hunts, captures, collects, or kills any
marine mammal or attempts any of the aforementioned actions.137 The
"harm" element of the ESA is noticeably absent here. This omission drastically limits the types of activities that are restricted by the MMPA, especially
concerning OIF. Even if a species is "harmed" under the ESA, by disrupting,
for instance, the feeding behavior of a listed whale, that same activity does
not fall under the purview of the MMPA. Therefore, because an OIF project
would not include any activities that would constitute a taking under the
MMPA,138 the statute would not govern any OIF projects. Additionally, in
this case, no scientific research exception is necessary because an OIF project only involves travel on the high seas and there are no MMPA license
requirements for oceanic travel. 139

134. 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (2003).
135. See 50 C.F.R. § 18.3 (2005) (listing marine mammals covered, which includes
polar bears, sea otters, walruses, etc.); 16 U.S.C. § 1372(f) (2015) (providing
protections for all whales by imposing an outright ban on any whaling
activities).
136. 16 U.S.C. § 1372.
137. 50 C.F.R. § 18.3.
138. 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (2003); A taking for MMPA purposes does not include harm
or any critical habitat considerations as the CWA does, which removes the
activity from the statute. See id.
139. See 50 C.F.R. § 18.13 (2005) (discussing the unlawful transportation of marine
mammals).
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National Environmental Policy Act

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) imposes environmental
obligations solely on the government. This Act obligates the government to
perform an environmental impact statement (EIS) for any major federal ac40
tion that will significantly affect the quality of the human environment.1
The EIS must include the environmental impacts of the proposed action including all adverse effects, any possible alternative actions, and all commitments of resources that would be involved in the proposed action.141 Yet,
because the obligation rests solely on the federal government and federally
funded projects Planktos would not be subject to the NEPA unless they were
subject to another federal permit.142 To weaken the statute's proverbial bite
even more, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that NEPA's EIS requirement is
solely a procedural hurdle intended to make those parties required to produce
an EIS seriously consider their pending action and the resulting consequences. However that requirement does not require parties to provide an
environmentally friendly or scientifically sound solution to the potential
problem.
Applied to OIF, if the project was funded in part or undertaken by a
federal agency, the agency is required to prepare an EIS.143 Although this
process might delay the OIF project, this statute has no other impact on the
project because the agency would not have to take the findings into consideration, nor would they have to investigate into the possibility alternative
solutions.
G.

Magnuson-Stevens Act

The Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) was adopted in an effort to conserve
essential fish habitats and to protect domestic fish stocks, as well as highly
migratory fish species.144 The MSA prohibits the fishing of any species of
fish by any vessel, U.S. flagged or non-U.S. flagged, that has a fishery management plan beyond the limits granted to the vessel pursuant to a permit.145
The extent of fishing permitted under the MSA depends on the type of fish
one seeks to harvest. For example, the fishing of anadromous species is permitted throughout the species' entire migratory range, excluding the part of
the range that is under a foreign country's sovereignty.146 Further, the United
140.
141.
142.
143.

42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012).
Id.
Id.

DEPT OF TRANSP., https://www.environment.fhwa.dot.gov/projdev/docueis.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2015).
144. 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (2015).
145. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a) (2015).
146. 16 U.S.C. § 181 1(b)(1) (2015).
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States has extended fishery management authority over all continental shelf
fishery resources.1 47
Whether MSA has jurisdiction over OIF is uncertain. "Fishing" is defined as: "(A) the catching, taking, or harvesting of fish; (B) the attempted
catching, taking, or harvesting of fish; (C) any other. activity which can reasonably be expected to result in the catching, taking, or harvesting of fish; or
(D) any operations at sea in support of, or in preparation for, any activity
described in subparagraphs (A) through (C)."148 "Taking" is not defined in
the MSA and there is no case law or secondary source that attempts to interpret the meaning of the term. It is unclear whether the MSA's use of "take" is
more similar to the ESA definition-which includes harming a species
through habitat modification-or the MMPA definition, which does not require harm. If the MSA definition of "take" does include harm, then it could
potentially regulate OIF; but if it does not include harm, then OIF is outside
of the MSA's jurisdiction. However, it is unlikely that OIF would fall under
the MSA's jurisdiction because a connection between fishing and placing
iron in the oceans is tenuous at best. However an argument can be made for
MSA's applicability if it is demonstrated that the OIF would diminish the
fish's food source and indirectly "take" the fish. Thus, if OIF does fall within
the MSA's jurisdiction, the MSA would apply to both private entities and
governmental entities.149
Regardless of whether OIF falls under the MSA, if OIF requires a permit under any statute, the MSA requires an assessment of each fishery and
the identification of an Essential Fish Habitat (EFH) in a fishery management
plan.150 Essentially, the plan will state the applicable regulations for each
fishery and identify the positive and negative impacts that might affect the
fishery.151 Identical to the ESA requirement to review every governmental
action for possible effects on an endangered species, the MSA requires review of every "action authorized, funded, or undertaken, or proposed to be
authorized, funded, or undertaken" by the federal agency in order to determine how the project affects the EFH.152 Again, this requirement does not
mandate a change in the project's operation, just a consultation. In essence, it
is just a procedural hurdle to force the actor to seriously consider the resulting consequences. Therefore, if a United States company is subject to a review by EPA, it requires a permit in addition to a MPRSA permit. This will
require an analysis into the project's potential impact to the EFHs in the area.

147. Id.
148. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(16) (2015).
149. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(36).
150. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1852(h), 1855(b).
151. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a).
152. Id.
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However, if the project was outside of the EEZ, it is unlikely that there
would be an effect on any EFH, and therefore MSA would not apply.
V.

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

THAT

GOVERNS

OIF

As noted above, OIF activities will take place on the high seas. Because
the high seas are beyond any one country's jurisdiction, the applicable international law should be addressed to fully understand any regulations a U.S.
company might be under when conducting OIF activities. This section will
address relevant international laws.
A.

International Law Introduction

There are two primary sources of international law: treaties and customary law.153 Treaties, like the Kyoto Protocol, are legal obligations that a state
takes upon itself to effect a particular outcome.1 54 The negotiated terms of the
treaty are only binding on the countries that sign and ratify it. 155 For the
United States, treaties become binding once the signed treaty is ratified by a
two-thirds majority of the Senate.156 The obligations agreed to by the President become binding on a citizen automatically if the treaty is self-executing
or upon the enactment of legislation by Congress for non-self-executing trea-

ties.

157

Contrary to treaties, customary law is one that is broadly applied without being expressly stated in any document.158 Customary law is broken into
two categories. First is hard customary law, which has a two-pronged formation mechanism. The first prong is state action. State action is "what a state
says and what a state does" with a focus on all branches of the state's government because the action must be pervasive in that state, and it must be prevalent in the international community.159 The second prong is opinio juris, or
"the assertion of a legal right."160 This prong of hard law is the subjective
prong, meaning the state action is conducted because the state believes it has

153. Hiram E. Chodosh, An Interpretive Theory of InternationalLaw: The Distinction Between Treaty and CustomaryLaw, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 973, 977
(1995).
154. Christopher Greenwood, Sources of International Law: An Introduction,
AUDIVISUAL LIBRARY OF INT'L L. (2014), http://legal.un.org/avl/s/Greenwood
IL.html (follow "English" link).
155. Id.
156. U.S.

CONST.

art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

157. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525-26 (2008).
158. Chodosh, supra note 153, at 977-98.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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an obligation to do so.161 While hard law creates legal obligations within the
international community, soft customary law is made up of principles that are
aspirational in nature.1 62 For instance, the precautionary principle and duty to
protect the environment are principles that every country should aspire towards, but, should a state breach the principle, there is no monetary remedy
for the affected country.1 6 3 It is important to note that with regards to customary law, a country does not have responsibility for a private citizen's actions
unless those actions were sanctioned by the state.I64 Thus, if a company undertook an OIF activity and harmed another country, the harmed country
could not sue the United States unless the action was taken on behalf of the
state.
There is a third "source" of international law, but it is very narrow in
scope and applicability. That source is the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
opinions.65 The purpose of the ICJ is to apply treaties and customary law to
the parties at bar.166 However, unlike U.S. courts-which create binding law
with every opinion that is handed down-the ICJ's opinions are only binding
on the parties involved and apply only to that dispute. 167 Therefore, if two
parties have a dispute that is factually identical to a dispute previously decided by the ICJ, regardless of whether they are the same parties to the previous dispute or two entirely new parties, the previous resolution does not
constitute precedent for the new dispute.168 Thus, at best, a principle used or
developed by the ICJ is advisory in nature and can be disregarded as a state
sees fit. In other words, the ICJ does not create any law that is binding on any
party outside of the decision at bar. It is not a "source" like treaties and
customary law and should only be considered as advisory.
B.

Treaties

The scope of a treaty is readily ascertainable. Like U.S. statutes, there is
a preamble that will specify exactly for what purpose the treaty was drafted.
But unlike U.S. statutes, many treaties do not impose any legal obligations or
prohibitions upon the parties that are subject to them. For example, the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) ad161. Id.
162. Catherine Tinker, Responsibilityfor Biological Diversity Conservation Under
InternationalLaw, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 777, 804 (1995).
163. Bodle, Climate Law and Geoengineering, supra note 8, at 456-57.
164.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §

165. Statute of the Court,

183 (1965).

http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=2&p3=0#CHAPTERII (last visited Oct. 19,
2015).

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.

INT'L COURT OF JUSTICE,
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dresses climate change directly, but its wording is so overly general that,
despite signing the Convention, the 192 signatory parties have not adopted
any legal obligations.169 This is the case with many treaties. This section will
look at the treaties that most directly apply to OIF and analyze whether those
treaties are applicable to a company based in the United States or if the
treaty's wording removes any legal bite.
1.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Negotiations for what became the UNFCCC began in December
The Convention was completed and adopted on May 9, 1992.171 It
entered into force on March 21, 1994, after obtaining the requisite fifty-state
ratifications.172 Currently, there are 192 parties to the UNFCCC, including
the United States.173 These parties have come together in an attempt "to limit
average global temperature increases and the resulting climate change, and to
cope with whatever impacts" there will be.174 The primary focus of the
UNFCCC is the global regulation of GHG emissions, not geoengineering or
OIF specifically. In fact, the UNFCCC is deafeningly silent on the topic of
OIF.175 At most, the UNFCCC could be read to authorize, but not require, use
of OIF as part of a state's plan to mitigate the effects of climate change and
to enhance GHG sinks and reservoirs.
Section 3.1 states that parties should "protect the climate system for the
benefit of present and future generations . . . in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities,"176 but
gives no guidance as to whether OIF could be considered as a legal option.
On the one hand, a party could argue that "protecting the climate system"
includes OIF, which would legally protect and promote OIF, but on the other
hand, another party could interpret that language to mean that geoengineering
should be excluded because of the possible adverse effects OIF may cause.
1990.170

169. Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto-protocol/status-of_

ratification/items/2613.php (last visited on Oct. 19, 2015).
170. Issues in the Negotiating Process, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/cop7/issues/briefhistory.html (last vis-

ited on Oct. 19, 2015).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See ICJ, supra note 165.
174. Background on the UNFCCC, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.intlessential-background/items/6031.php (last

visited on Oct. 19, 2015).
175. Bodle, Climate Law and Geoengineering, supra note 8, at 456.
176. Framework Convention on Climate Change § 3.1, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S.
107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
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Article 4, which contains the few obligations that the signatory parties
agreed to abide by, uses vague and general language that may or may not
impact the legality of geoengineering. Section 4.1 applies to all parties regardless of their development.177 In its totality, Section 4.1 follows the document's theme of providing no direction as to whether OIF should be
considered legally viable. 178 Some of the parties' accepted obligations include: inventorying sources of anthropogenic GHGs, sharing technology
used in GHG emission control, cooperating in the preparation for adaptation,
and if necessary, to participate in research.179 None of these obligations indicate whether OIF is valid. However, Section 4.1(f) does require that parties
consider climate change in their national environmental policies and adopt
appropriate methods, like an environmental impact assessment, when undertaking any project that may be used to mitigate climate change.so This provision also requires that parties consider techniques, including OIF, that might
prove useful in the event of a climate change emergency.181 In other words,
the signatory parties may consider OIF's effects in their environmental policies, but that is all that is required under Section 4.1(f); no more, no less.
The final provision that may legally pertain to geoengineering, but not
OIF specifically, is Section 4.2(a), which requires developed countries to
adopt policies to mitigate climate change by protecting and enhancing their
GHG sinks and reservoirs.182 However, this requirement only mandates that
each state determine the implications of their policies.1 83 If the state determines that OIF is too detrimental to the Earth's climate, the state is not obligated to utilize OIF.184 Conversely, if the state determines that OIF is a safe
and viable option in the war against climate change, the state can still elect
not to utilize OIF. These requirements do not prohibit OIF from assisting in a
nation's mitigation strategy, nor does it impose it as a requirement. Thus the
UNFCCC does not directly regulate OIF.
2.

Convention on Biological Diversity

The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) has taken the most definitive stance and created the most comprehensive regulatory scheme for
geoengineering to date. Inspired by the international community's growing
commitment to sustainable development, the CBD calls its signatory parties

177. Id. § 4.1.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. § 4.1(f).
181. Id.
182. UNFCCC, supra note 176, § 4.2(a).
183. Id.
184. Id.
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to develop plans for the sustainable use of biological diversity.185 Initially,
these plans called for states to set aside areas of undeveloped land that were
essential to protecting biological diversity, rehabilitate and restore degraded
ecosystems, and manage development by releasing genetically modified organisms, among other requirements.186
The CBD entered into force on December 29, 1993,187 and currently has

193 signatory parties.188 The United States signed but has not yet ratified the
treaty.1 89 In 2008, the CBD parties adopted Resolution IX/16,190 which requests that all governments "ensure that ocean fertilization activities do not
take place until there is an adequate scientific basis on which to justify such
activities, including assessing associated risks, and a global, transparent and
effective control and regulatory mechanism is in place for these activities;
with the exception of small scale scientific research studies within coastal
waters."I91 This resolution places a quasi-moratorium directly on any commercial or large-scale research project. However, it does not define what
qualifies as a large or small-scale research project. The Resolution does however provide that small scale research studies "should only be authorized if
justified by the need to gather specific scientific data, and should also be
subject to a thorough prior assessment of the potential impacts of the research studies on the marine environment, and be strictly controlled, and not
be used for generating and selling carbon offsets or any other commercial
purposes."92 However, because the United States never ratified the convention,1 93 this quasi-moratorium would not regulate Planktos directly. The
United States Legislature would have to pass a bill for CBD to regulate
Planktos.
185. Convention on Biological Diversity art. 6, June 5, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 79
[hereinafter CBD].
186. Id. art. 8.
187. Introduction, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://www.cbd.intlintro/default.shtml (last visited on Oct. 19, 2015).
188. List of Parties, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://www.cbd.int/
convention/parties/list#tab=0 (last visited on Oct. 19, 2015).

189. Id.
190. A resolution to CBD is a recommendation to the signatory parties. There are no
binding legal obligations created by the resolution, although the parties may
heed them. However, for a legal obligation to be imposed on a signatory party
there must be legislation passed by the party; otherwise, the resolution is
merely advisory.

191. CBD Decision IX/16, para. C(4), U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/IX/16
(Oct. 9, 2008), http://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/default.shtml?id=l 1659.
192. Id.
193. List of Parties, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, https://www.cbd.int/
information/parties.shtml (last visited Oct. 19, 2015).
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Environmental Modification Convention

The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use
of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) was the first treaty to
deal directly with geoengineering. ENMOD prohibits the hostile use of "environmental modification techniques," which include "changing-through
the deliberate manipulation of natural processes-the dynamics, composition
or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and
atmosphere, or of outer space."I 94 Although "environmental modification
techniques" could include OIF, the Convention focuses on activities taken
during time of war or that are intentionally hostile to another state. 19 5 Although the term "hostile" is not defined in the document, its common usage
suggests that it involves any activity directed at an enemy, or activity that is
adverse to another state.1 9 6 Both definitions indicate that an action taken
against the wishes of another state could be hostile, even if it is scientific in
nature or intended to be beneficial. However, Article m of ENMOD provides
that states should not be restrained from peaceful use.1 97 This indicates that
for an activity to be hostile, there must be a hostile intent. Further, ENMOD
calls for parties to contribute to "international economic and scientific cooperation," if they are able.198 This implies that commercial and scientific use
of geoengineering activities would be peaceful. Thus, commercial or research
OIF projects would likely fall outside the scope of the Convention.199
ENMOD's limit on hostile environmental modification techniques suggests that the drafters and signatory parties anticipated permitting peaceful
use of technology to manipulate the environment, which would include OIF.
The only requirement for peaceful geoengineering is that the parties contribute to the exchange of scientific information.200 This gives the parties discretion as to whether, and how, to use geoengineering techniques.
4.

London Convention and London Protocol

The London Convention (LC), and London Protocol (LP) "have established themselves as the competent international body for the regulation of
194. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques art. I-II, October 5, 1978 31 UST 333,
1108 U.N.T.S. 152 [hereinafter ENMOD].
195. Id.
196. Hostile, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/hostile (last visited on Oct. 19, 2015).
197. ENMOD, supra note 194, art. III.
198. Id.
199. Ralph Bodle, Geoengineering and InternationalLaw: The Searchfor Common
Legal Ground, 46 TULSA L. REV. 305, 312 (2010) [hereinafter Bodle,
Geoengineering and International Law].

200. ENMOD, supra note 194, art. 111.
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[OIF]."201 The LC was established in 1975 to protect the oceans, primarily
through its prohibition on ocean dumping.202 The LP was developed as the
LC's successor, but the LP and LC essentially work together as one unit.203
Even though the two documents are similar, there are differences.204 For example, "[t]he [LC] requires Contracting Parties (CP) control and prevent the
pollution of the sea by the dumping of waste, while the [LP] employs
stronger language, requiring CPs to prevent, reduce and where practicable
eliminate pollution caused by dumping."205 The LP currently has less than
half the number of contracting parties as the LC.206 The United States ratified
the LC, but has not yet ratified the LP.207
OIF may be regulated by the LC/LP, even though at first impression it
seems like it may lie outside of the treaty's scope. 208 The original wording of
the LC/LP prevents "dumping" of material, but OIF researchers are not
dumping iron for disposal purposes. 209 Rather, they are placing it in the ocean
for a specific purpose, and this implication removes OIF from the scope of
the LP/LC's anti-dumping prohibition. 210 To address this uncertainty, in October 2008, the contracting parties to the LC/LP adopted a non-binding resolution stating that: (1) OIF falls within the scope of the LC/LP; (2) OJF
research activities fall within the placement exception and will not be considered mere disposal; (3) using the soon-to-be-developed assessment framework, each research project will be assessed to determine whether the
research project furthers the objectives of the LC/LP; and (4) large scale
commercial OIF projects should be prohibited.211 Further, the resolution expressly forbids all OIF, other than legitimate scientific research, stating that
such projects do not qualify for any exemptions. 212 In addition, in 2010 the
parties also adopted a non-binding resolution that establishes the OIF "as-

201. Eick, supra note 13, at 352.
202. Id. at 364-65.
203. Id. at 364.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 365 (internal quotation citations omitted).
206. Id.
207. Partiesto the London Convention and London Protocol, IMO, http://www.imo
.org/en/OurWork/Environment/LCLP/Documents/Map%20of%20Parties%20
Sept%202014.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2015).
208. Id.; see also Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter, IMO, http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/LCLP/Pages/default.aspx (last visted Oct. 19, 2015).
209. See Markus & Ginzky, supra note 36, at 479.
210. See id. at 480.
211. I.M.O. Res. annex 6, U.N. Doc. LC30/16, (Oct. 31, 2008).
212. Markus & Ginzky, supra note 36, at 480.
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sessment framework," which requires the acting party to perform a scientific
quality check and environmental impact assessment. 213
Because both of these resolutions are not legally binding, a country may
take these provisions under advisement and does not have to comply with
their express requirements.214 Therefore, even though the LC and LP directly
address OIF and lay out a regulatory framework that promotes research that
seeks to determine whether OIF is a viable mitigation technique, the signatory parties have no obligations to follow and implement its requirements.
Instead, these provisions provide a list of advisory comments and actions that
parties may consider as they develop their own environmental policies.
5.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is
regarded as the "constitution for ocean governance."215 Adopted in 1982, this
Convention codified customary international law, which is binding on all
states-including non-signatory states-requiring states to: "(1) prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment, (2) prohibit the transfer of damage or hazards from one area to another, and (3) protect rare and
fragile ecosystems, as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered species from pollution." 216 Currently, there are 167 signatory parties.
217 However, the United States has not ratified UNCLOS.218
UNCLOS's purpose, broadly stated, is "to protect and preserve the
marine environment."219 In order to accomplish this purpose, Article 194 requires states to "take all necessary measures to ensure that [activities] under
their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their environment."220 Specifically, states are required, individually or jointly, to "prevent, reduce, and control pollution of
the marine environment from any source, using any for this purpose the best
practicable means at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities,
and they shall endeavor to harmonize their policies in this connection."221 In
evaluating these measures, states should not transfer damage from one area

213. Id. at 481.
214. Id.
215. Abate & Greenlee, supra note 54, at 572.
216. Id. at 573.
217. See UNCLOS, ChronologicalLists of Ratifications, UNITED NATIONS, http://
www.un.org/Depts/los/reference files/chronological lists-of-ratifications.htm
(last visited on Oct. 19, 2015).
218. Id.
219. UNCLOS, supra note 73, art. 192.
220. Id. art. 194.
221. Id.
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to another or from one form to another222 and should instead create international rules and regulations for the "protection and preservation of the marine
environment, taking into account characteristic regional features."223
UNCLOS brings OIF into its scope through the use of a very broad
definition of pollution.224 UNCLOS defines pollution as:
[T]he introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or
energy into the marine environment . .. which results or is likely
to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and
marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities.225
This definition will continue to include OIF until research-which can only
be conducted in the states' territorial seas- 22 6 demonstrates an absence of
"deleterious effects" on any living resource. 227 Living resources include, but
are not limited to: the use of nutrients by the phytoplankton that reduces
growth potential of other organisms, acidification of the marine environment,
and eutrophication.228 Because of these possible deleterious effects, OIF at
least on the large scale, must be prevented, reduced, and controlled by every
state. 229
Additionally, an OIF project can directly violate Article 195 of UNCLOS.230 OIF is an attempt to pull CO 2 from the atmosphere and place it in
the depths of the ocean. 23 1By removing CO 2 from the atmosphere, where it is
causing mayhem and may cause acidification, there is a transfer of harm
from one "area" to another.232 In other words, the harm CO 2 causes in the
atmosphere, namely climate change, is transferred to the oceans, where the
resulting acidification destroys coral reefs and harms marine life.233
UNCLOS requires that states, internationally or regionally, create rules
and regulations to preserve the marine environment.234 This goal has been

222. Id. art. 195.
223. Id. art. 196.
224. Id. art. 1.
225. UNCLOS, supra note 73, art. 1(1)(4).
226. See id. art. 193.
227. See id. art. 1(1)(4).
228. See Abate & Greenlee, supra note 54, at 566-69.
229. See UNCLOS, supra note 73, art. 194.
230. Id. art. 195.
231. Abate &'Greenlee, supra note 54, at 560-61.
232. See UNCLOS, supra note 73, art. 195.
233. See id.
234. See id. art. 197.
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partially accomplished in the international arena through the LC/LP. 235 However, because the LC/LP is not legally binding, it does not fully meet UNCLOS's requirement.236 However, through the passage of MPRSA, rules and
regulations implemented locally in the United States have done a better job at
meeting UNCLOS's requirements.237 However, without more specific and
legally binding rules and regulations, UNCLOS remains rather impotent in
prohibiting OIF, even with the current framework in place.
C.

International Customary Law

The scope of international customary environmental law, which exists
in the absence of a treaty obligation, is uncertain. However, there are a variety of customary international law concepts that may be relevant in assessing
the legality of geoengineering actions. 238 Still, these principles may not establish any effective legal obligations because they are not recognized or
because they are too general to provide any uniformity or certainty in their
application.
1.

Duty to Prevent Transboundary Harm

The duty to prevent transboundary environmental harm is a cornerstone
of international environmental law and has generally been recognized as an
"enforceable" obligation under international law.239 This duty requires states
to prevent activities within its jurisdiction or mitigate any harm that occurs to
the environment of other states. 240 A state in breach of this duty could be
compelled to cease the activity, guarantee that the activity will not happen
again, pay damages, or return the harmed state to its previous condition.241
In order for a state to breach this duty when utilizing geoengineering,
the complaining state must prove that: (1) the state in question actually performed the activity;242 (2) the activity caused the harm alleged; and (3) the
state in question failed to apply due diligence, if applicable.243 However, the
235. See Eick, supra note 13, at 365.
236. See Markus & Ginzky, supra note 36, at 480.
237. See Hester, supra note 6, at 886-87.
238. See Bodle, Geoengineering and InternationalLaw, supra note 199, at 306.

239.
240.
241.
242.

See id. at 306.
Id.
Id.
G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/49 (Vol. I)/Corr.4,
art. 4 (Dec. 12, 2001 ),http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draftarti
cles/9_6_2001.pdf ("An activity can be attributed to the state if a representative
of the state conducted the activity; this would include agency or agency funded
activities. If the project was conducted solely by a private party the activity
would not be considered to be conducted by the state.").

243. Bodle, Geoengineering and InternationalLaw, supra note 199, at 306-07.
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amount of diligence required is determined on a case-by-case basis, leaving
quite a bit of legal uncertainty.244 Thus, strict liability is not imposed for any
damage caused by OIF. Further, the state in question may assert "necessity"
as an affirmative defense, if it is able to show that a climate crisis necessitated the use of a particular geoengineering activity.245 The main shortcoming
to the duty to prevent transboundary harm is that this obligation is retrospective in nature and, therefore, has very little ability to enjoin a state from
acting in a manner that may be considered a breach.246
2.

Duty to Perform an Environmental Impact Assessment

Recently scholars have suggested that the duty to perform an environmental impact assessment be given legal force by the ICJ, places a duty on
every state, not just the signatory parties to the UNFCCC.247 The duty requires states to
[t]ake climate change considerations into account, to the extent
feasible, in their relevant social, economic and environmental policies and actions, and employ appropriate methods, for example
impact assessments, formulated and determined nationally, with a
view to minimizing adverse effects on the economy, on public
health and on the quality of the environment, of projects or measures undertaken by them to mitigate or adapt to climate
8
change. 24
In this regard, the ICJ is recognizing that this common practice amounts to "a
requirement under general international law to undertake an environmental
impact assessment where there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity
may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared resource."24 9 The ICJ did not provide the required data and
analysis to be included in the assessment. However, the ICJ did state that an
assessment involves "having regard to the nature and magnitude of the proposed development and its likely adverse impact on the environment as well
as to the need to exercise due diligence in conducting such an assessment."
250 Further, the assessment must be conducted and produced before the activ-

244. Id. at 307.
245. Id. at 308.
246. Id.
247. See id. at 311.
248. UNFCCC, supra note 176, § 4(1)(f).
249. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, [
204 (Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15877 [hereinafter
Pulp Mills].
250. Id. at 1 205.
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ity is carried out.251 Finally, there must be continuous monitoring to track the
environmental effects of the activity.252
3.

Precautionary Principle

The precautionary principle is becoming part of international customary
law, and although not completely established, it has been invoked in many
instances.253 The precautionary principle, codified at UNFCCC section 3.3,
states that "[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such
measures."254 OIF risks are assessed depending on: "(1) in relation to a scenario with substantial mitigation as well as; [and] (2) in relation to a scenario
of unmitigated climate change, the precautionary principle embodies the core
arguments both for and against" OIF.255 On the one hand, due to the risks
associated with OIF, one could argue that the principle forbids the implementation of geoengineering because of its possible severe consequences. 256 On
the other hand, the precautionary principle could be used to call for and legalize OIF strategies because it states that parties should attempt to "mitigate
[climate change's] adverse effects" without letting a "lack of full scientific
certainty . . . be used as a reason for postponing such measures."257 While the
precautionary principle is ambiguous as to the legality of OIF, it places the
burden of showing the harmfulness of the activity on the acting party when
there is a breach of another law.258
VI.

WHERE

Do WE GO

FROM HERE?

OIF remains enveloped in controversy. 259 It could provide time for
policymakers to create and implement a comprehensive plan to reduce emissions and reverse the current path towards a climate crisis.260 However, it
also could potentially destroy the marine environment. 261 With some regulatory frameworks that could be applied with some modification and with the
need to figure out a plan so that this climate crisis does not hit while the

251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Bodle, Geoengineering and InternationalLaw, supra note 199, at 309-11.
254. UNFCCC, supra note 176, § 3(3).
255. Bodle, Climate Law and Geoengineering, supra note 8, at 464.
256. Id. at 459.
257. UNFCCC, supra note 176, § 3(3).
258. Bodle, Climate Law and Geoengineering, supra note 8, at 459.
259. Eick, supra note 13, at 354.
260. Id.
261. Id.
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world is twiddling its thumbs, the question must be asked: What needs to be
done in order to effectively regulate OIF?
One way to regulate OIF would be through the treaties. For instance,
Planktos was attempting to use OIF to generate carbon credits that it could
sell to companies that were subject to the Kyoto Protocol. One way to regulate this type of OIF use is to state in the treaty the specific manner that
specifies how OIF must be conducted in order to qualify as a carbon credit.
This would incentivize companies to engage in OIF to comply with regulations and realize their profits. Similarly, a state that is subject to the Kyoto
Protocol could, in its implementation plan, regulate OIF through the same
mechanism. This second option would be a piecemeal approach, but would
have the same effect as the first. Either option probably requires that parties
obtain permits, and would also impose a reporting requirement so as to verify
that OIF activities comply with regulations. These requirements would place
conditions on OIF activities that could prevent a misuse of this strategy. If a
company was not in compliance, the credits generated would not be sold on
the market, effectively allowing the market to dictate the viability of this
strategy. If OIF regulations were working, as they should, the market would
demand more; if not, OIF would fade into the night.
From a policy perspective, one must recognize that OIF requires that a
plan contemplate whether-in the face of substantially insufficient and contradictory scientific data-one should act or refrain from acting. This consideration is made in addition to having to tackle the onerous task of creating a
comprehensive regulatory framework, while aiming to garner the cooperation
of nation states. 262 Further, these considerations are made in light of the need
for a regulatory framework at experimental phase, along with the fact that at
any time a single nation state could decide to unilaterally implement OIFrealizing the gravity of the OIF conundrum.263
To create a regulatory framework for OIF a few fundamental questions
must be addressed. First, which of the following norms frame the debate:
"precaution, intergenerational equity, permanent sovereignty over natural resources, sustainable development, common concern of mankind, common
heritage of mankind" or another?264 Second, what questions will the framework answer? For instance, "what types of impact assessment are required
prior to deployment, how will state sovereignty be balanced with global
oversight, how will cases of transboundary harm be dealt with, what type of
dispute-settlement system is needed, [and] who has the veto power"?265
Third, while the regulatory framework is being debated and created by politicians, what system will be in place to promote a transparent program that
facilitates the sharing of results of research conducted between nation states?
262. Leal-Arcas & Filis-Yelaghotis, supra note 22, at 134.
263. Id.
264. Carlame, supra note 5, at 659.
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Fourth, the system must be able to address the effects that will inevitably

follow implementation of OIF.267

Addressing these fundamental questions will provide clarity as to the
structure of the framework, which requires: a multilateral, top-down response
based on the intergenerational and transboundary nature of the problem.268
This approach should be guided by a set of principles: (1) OIF should be
regulated as a public good, based on the argument that, while the involvement of the private sector in the delivery of a geoengineering technique
should not be prohibited and may indeed be encouraged, regulation of such
techniques should be undertaken in the public interest by the appropriate
bodies at the state and/or international levels; (2) geoengineering decision
making should be informed wherever possible by public participation, including a duty to notify, consult, and, ideally, obtain the prior informed consent of those affected by the research activities; (3) research plans for
geoengineering should be completely disclosed and results should be openly
published; (4) the impacts of geoengineering research should be conducted
by an independent body of a regional and international character where techniques are likely to have a transboundary impact; and (5) robust governance
structures should be put in place before any technologies are deployed and
should make use of existing rules and institutes wherever possible. 269
These principles should guide the creation of guiding axioms, which in
turn will provide a multigenerational commitment.270 Further, the framework
must be viewed "as a complement to adaptation and the building of resilience
in that it might prevent the worst impacts, and . . . act as an insurance policy
against the very worst impacts."271 However, the axioms that create the OIF

regulatory framework must be self-executing so that they create legally binding obligations and prohibitions immediately on U.S. entities. The framework must also be able to enforce the regulations so that these controversial
strategies do not compound the issues. Finally, it must be able to prevent a

266. See id.
267. See id.
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rogue nation state from sending every individual on planet Earth into
oblivion.
VII.

CONCLUSION

OlF has the potential to help mitigate the effects of climate change, and
the rewards for this planet could be economically large. But OIF also could
potentially increase the existing done to this planet. Without a better understanding of what will result when this geoengineering strategy is implemented, there needs to be a strong international regulatory framework in
place to monitor and control how much and when the activities take place.
Currently, MPRSA would be an avenue of regulation, as would the LC/LP.
Since MPRSA is the United States embodiment of LC/LP, we are left with
MPRSA as the sole regulatory body on U.S. companies and governments that
may attempt to conduct OIF activities. Right now, that is enough. However,
the international community needs to find a way, through a treaty or through
piecemeal adoption of regulations by the parties to the treaty, to regulate OIF
so that the potential for disaster is never realized.

Comments

